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NOTES
Tinker Goes to the Theater: Student
First Amendment Rights and High
School Theatrical Productions in
Seyfried v. Walton
By Deborah A. Churton-Hale*
Introduction
The scope of high school students' First Amendment rights' has
long been uncertain. Despite the Supreme Court's sweeping pro-
nouncements of First Amendment protection for students in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District,2 the lower courts
have had difficulty in balancing those rights against the broad discre-
tion accorded public school authorities in the areas of administration,
student and teacher conduct, and curriculum.3 Uncertainty about the
proper role of secondary education in this country-indoctrination as
opposed to the "open classroom" or "marketplace of ideas" model4 -
* B.A., 1975, University of California, Berkeley; member, third year class.
1. In pertinent part, the First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech.... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. In Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925), the Supreme Court made the First Amendment applicable to the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
.... " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). For a discussion of Tinker, see infra notes 77-89 and accompa-
nying text.
3. The states have granted local boards of education almost exclusive control over
public education. Comment, Not on Our Shelves. A First Amendment Analysis of Library
Censorshop in the Public Schools, 61 NEB. L. REV. 98, 101 (1982); See also Niccolai, The Right
to Read and School.Library Censorshp, 10 J. L. & EDUC. 23 (1981).
4. Comment, What Will We Tell the Children? A Discussion of Current Judicial Opin-
ion on the Scope ofdeas Acceptablefor Presentation in Primary and Secondary Education, 56
TUL. L. REV. 960 (1982). The three leading theories regarding the role of the classroom
include in locoparentis, indoctrination, and the marketplace of ideas model. Id at 962. See
infra notes 202-28 and accompanying text. See also Comment, Not on Our Shelves, supra
note 3, at 100-01.
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exacerbates the difficulty.
Tinker prompted a series of student lawsuits involving such issues
as student hair length,5 student suspensions,6 control over student pub-
lications,7 and library censorship.' What came to be known as the
Tinker test has been used as the basis for deciding most cases involving
a student's freedom of expression.' Under that test, student expression
is protected unless it "materially disrupts classwork or involves sub-
stantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.""0
The Tinker test, however, has not been particularly helpful in li-
brary censorship cases because the right at issue is not expression but
the right to know or the right to receive information." The lower
courts 2 and Supreme Court-most recently in Board of Education v.
Pico 3-have struggled to create an appropriate test applicable in cases
involving the removal of books from high school libraries and curricu-
lum. A plurality of the Court in Pico held that "local school boards
may not remove books from school library shelves simply because they
dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to
5. The hair length cases, heard largely during the early 1970's, resulted in a split be-
tween courts which found that students had a constitutionally protected interest and those
which saw no constitutional issue. Compare Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972)
with Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972). See also
Comment, Not on Our Shelves, supra note 3, at 107.
6. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (dealing with the procedural aspects of
student suspensions).
7. See infra notes 90-103 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of the
student publications cases, see Letwin, Regulation of Underground Newspapers on Public
School Campuses in California, 22 UCLA L. REv. 141 (1974); Note, Beyond the Schoolhouse
Gate: Protecting the Off-Campus First Amendment Freedoms of Students, 59 NEB. L. REV. 790
(1980).
8. See infra notes 123-92 and accompanying text.
9. For purposes of this Note, the term "freedom of expression" refers to the doing of
an act or engaging in some conduct (te., writing, speaking) in order to express one's beliefs
or opinions. For example, the student publication, suspension, and hair length cases in-
volved various aspects of freedom of expression since confficts with school administrators
arose only after students active0 expressed themselves in some fashion on school grounds.
Freedom of expression presupposes affirmative action by the student.
10. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
11. This point is discussed infra notes 104-22 and accompanying text. See also Com-
ment, Not on Our Shelves, supra note 3, at 108. Unlike the exercise of freedom of expression,
the right to receive information requires no active participation. The information and ideas
that a student has a right to receive should be available whether or not she chooses to obtain
them. The Supreme Court however, has "cautioned restraint in judicial interference with
those decisionmakers who have shouldered the responsibility for the educational process";
as a result, the right to receive information has not been widely recognized outside the con-
fines of the school library. Seyfried v. Walton, 512 F. Supp. 235, 238 (D. Del. 1981).
12. See infra notes 123-67 and accompanying text.
13. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). Pico involved the removal of books from a school library
based on a school board determination that the books contained offensive language, im-
proper sexual references, and "anti-American" and "anti-Christian" statements. Id. at 857.
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, 'prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or
other matters of opinion.' "14 No clear standard, however, was articu-
lated in the opinion.
Student First Amendment rights cases involve the balancing of
competing interests: the students' interests in freedom of expression
and inquiry in relation to the schools' interests in maintaining disci-
pline, inculcating values, and "nurturing and safeguarding morality."'15
The Tinker test provides such a tool to weigh student and administra-
tive interests in freedom of expression cases. Prior to the Supreme
Court's holding in Pico--which suggests a balancing test but recognizes
that there is a point beyond which school boards cannot go in protect-
ing their interests -the lower courts reached inconsistent results in
book removal situations."7 The balancing process has been compli-
cated even after Pico by a surfeit of judicial hesitancy to interfere in
school operations and administrative decisions, even where the free-
dom of expression and the right to receive information are implicated.
The leading example of this judicial hesitancy is the Supreme Court's
statement in Epperson v. Arkansas,18 that
[b]y and large, public education in our Nation is committed to
the control of state and local authorities. Courts do not and can-
not intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily
operation of school systems and which do not directly and
sharply implicate basic constitutional values. 9
The Tinker test affords more exact means of deciding whether a
student's right of freedom of expression has been violated than do
either the pre-Pico standards or an extrapolation of the balancing
methods used in Pico to rule on library censorship. Armed with the
Tinker test, courts should have few concerns about inappropriately in-
tervening in conflicts involving student freedom of expression. With-
out a similarly explicit test in cases involving the right to know, courts
are left to decide for themselves what actions "directly and sharply"
infringe upon First Amendment values. Further, since the Supreme
Court has refused to question closely whether the exercise of adminis-
trative discretion violates student First Amendment rights,z" lower
14. Id at 872.
15. Meiklejohn, The Reconciliation of First Amendment Freedoms with Local Control
Over the Moral Development of Minors, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1205, 1205 (1978).
16. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 123-67 and accompanying text.
18. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
19. Id. at 103. See infra notes 90-103 and 123-67 and accompanying text. In all but two
library censorship cases, Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors, 638
F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980) and Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H.
1979), courts have cited Epperson as one reason for their hesistancy to review school admin-
istrative decisions.
20. See, e.g., Epperson, 313 U.S. at 104.
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courts need not assume the responsibility of trying to formulate a stan-
dard similar to the Tinker test for use in library censorship cases. Fi-
nally, courts have no well-defined standard to apply in cases involving
claims that cannot be readily categorized as involving either freedom of
expression or the right to receive information.
The Third Circuit recently decided a student First Amendment
rights case, Seyfried v. Walton,2 involving what the court deemed a
curriculum decision by the school authorities-the cancellation of a
high school theatrical production of the Broadway musical P6ppin22 be-
cause of its sexual themes. The Third Circuit found that production of
the play was part of the school's curriculum and that the school super-
intendent's decision to cancel the play did not "'directly and sharply
implicate basic constitutional values.' "23 As a result, the court refused
to intervene.
By categorizing Seyfried as a case involving a curriculum decision,
the Third Circuit declined to use either the Tinker freedom of expres-
sion or the pre-Pico library censorship balancing tests.24 The court
confined itself to using the judicial deference approach, and to inquir-
ing only whether the superintendent's determination about the play's
sexual content implicated any constitutional value.25 Since the judicial
deference approach neither requires the court to balance the interests of
the students and the school administration nor furnishes a concrete
standard, the Third Circuit reached what may be a proper decision, but
applied an imprecise and inappropriate standard. Such decisionmak-
ing adds to the uncertainty permeating the area of First Amendment
rights.
This Note discusses and critically analyzes Seyfried. Next, it traces
cases developing students' First Amendment rights of expression and
access to information. 6 It asserts that confficting views on the proper
function of education have contributed to the difficulty courts have had
in deciding student expression and library censorship cases. This Note
suggests that future treatment of such cases should involve a balancing
21. 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981).
22. S. SCHWARTZ, PIPPIN (1975).
23. 668 F.2d at 217 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. at 104).
24. Seyfried was decided prior to the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Pico. The li-
brary censorship balancing tests available to the Third Circuit in Seyfried were those sug-
gested by the Sixth Circuit in Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th
Cir. 1976), and the district court of Massachusetts in Right to Read Defense Comm. v.
School Comm. of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). The court in Right to Read
suggested an approach similar to the Tinker test. See infra notes 123-67 and accompanying
text.
25. 668 F.2d at 217.
26. Since the Third Circuit distinguished Seyfried from cases in the areas of student
publication and library censorship cases, Seyfried, 668 F.2d at 216, this Note is confined to a
discussion of the trends that have emerged in those two areas.
test, like that in Tinker, which recognizes the maturity and capabilities
of high school students. Finally, this Note concludes that since the pro-
tection of a play entails expression by students, a Tinker-type balancing
test would have been a more appropriate method of analysis for resolv-
ing Seyfried.
I. Seyfried v. Walton
A. Factual Background and District Court Decision
In December 1980, the drama production director at Caesar Rod-
ney High School in Dover, Delaware chose the musical Pippin for pres-
entation the following Spring. Because the play contained certain
sexually suggestive scenes, the director, an English teacher at the
school, edited the script to make it more appropriate for a high school
production. 7 The assistant principal approved the edited script, and
parts were cast and rehearsals begun. Shortly thereafter, a parent of a
cast member complained to the president of the school board that the
play "mocked God and prayer." 8 The complaint was referred to the
school superintendent and the school board. 9 The school board ulti-
mately decided that the play did not mock religion, but was inappropri-
ate for production by a public high school because of its sexual
content.30
27. The play is a fictionalized account of the life of Charlemagne's son, Pippin. Pippin
is young and single, and determined to live a meaningful life. "The play chronicles his
several efforts to find himself and the meaning of existence. In turn, he tries. . the 'glories'
of war, the 'joys' of the flesh, and exhilaration of social and political reform, the artistic life,
and the way of the church; each is ultimately unsatisfying." Seyfried v. Walton, 512 F.
Supp. 235, 237 (D. Del. 1981).
The two scenes edited by the high school director involved sexual experiences. In scene
four, entitled "The Flesh," Pippin's grandmother sings of "the joys of the flesh and urges
him to take advantage of his youth while he can. This is followed by a dance in which
several girls attempt to seduce Pippin. . . ." Id The stage direction describes the final
scene: "ALL the BOYS and the GIRLS become involved and THEY begin to show Pippin
every possible form of sexual activity." Id. The director's annotated script indicated "that
the dancers will 'entice' Pippin, but that the 'tone' will be tasteful." Id In scene seven,
Pippin has become involved with a widow and "they go to bed on stage while dancers simu-
late sexual intercourse." Id. The bed scene and the dance were stricken from the edited
version, although it is implicit that Pippin and the widow "have experienced physical inti-
macy." Id.
28. 512 F. Supp. at 236.
29. The American educational system is managed at the local level; most states have
delegated extensive authority over the actual administration of the schools to local institu-
tions. States usually divide their territory into school districts, which are each governed by a
board of education or a school board. These boards are responsible for the day-to-day
operation of the schools. Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual
Rights, 74 MICH. L. Rav. 1373, 1379-80 (1976).
30. 512 F. Supp. at 236. The Brief for Appellant at 21, Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214
(3d Cir. 1981), states that the lower court did not find that the excised version of P#4pin was
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Parents of three members of the Pippin cast and crew filed an ac-
tion under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,3 ' claiming an infringe-
ment on the students' First Amendment rights of expression. The
district court held that cancellation of the play did not violate the stu-
dents' rights.
32
B. Seyfriedon Appeal: The Third Circuit's Decision
The Third Circuit acknowledged that "dramatic expression" is
speech for the purposes of the First Amendment. 31 It noted, however,
that "a school community 'exists for a specialized purpose--the educa-
tion of young people,' including the communication of both knowledge
and social values."' 34 The court concluded that the First Amendment
must "be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment. .... 35
According to the court, the critical factor in the case was the rela-
tionship of the play to the school curriculum.36 The Third Circuit
unanimously ruled that the lower court had properly distinguished stu-
dent newspapers and "other 'non-program related expressions of stu-
dent opinion'" from school-sponsored theatrical productions.
37
Noting that participation in the play, although voluntary, was consid-
ered by the school as part of the theater arts curriculum, the court of
appeals found the lower court's distinction "not clearly erroneous.
38
The Third Circuit also considered the likelihood that the schoors
sponsorship of the musical would be viewed as an endorsement of the
ideas the play contained. The court stated that the school has an "im-
portant interest in avoiding the impression that it has endorsed a view-
obscene. This Note does not discuss the obscenity rulings since obscenity was never at issue
in the case.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any stat-
ute, ordinance [or] regulation ... of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States. . . to the deprivation of any rights, priviliges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
32. 512 F. Supp. at 239.
33. Seyfried, 668 F.2d at 216 (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 557-58 (1975)).
34. 668 F.2d at 216.
35. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
36. 668 F.2d at 216.
37. Id.
38. Id. The court stated that: "The selection of the artistic work to be given as the
spring production does not differ in principle from the selection of course curriculum, a
process which courts have traditionally left to the expertise of educators." Id. Quoting from
the lower court opinion, the Third Circuit continued, "Just as a student has no First Amend-
ment right to study a particular aspect or period of history . . . he or she has no First
Amendment right to participate in the production of a particular dramatic work or version
thereof." Id
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point at variance with its educational program."39 It further noted that
the school's refusal to produce the play did not constitute a "reasonable
threat of a chilling effect on the free exchange of ideas within the school
community. '40 The Third Circuit thus held that because the school is
responsible for inculcating both knowledge and values in its students,
the administration must be allowed to decide how its limited resources
of time and money should be spent: "[D]ecisions as to what will be
taught will necessarily involve an acceptance or preference of some val-
ues over others.'
The court of appeals affirmed that "'[c]ourts do not and cannot
intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily opera-
tion of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate
basic constitutional values.' 42 Finding no such implication of the stu-
dents' First Amendment rights, the Third Circuit upheld the lower
court's judgment in favor of the school board.43
II. Critical Analysis of Seyfried v. Walton
Crucial to the Third Circuit's decision in Seyfriedis the acceptance
of the lower court's classification of the play as part of the curriculum.
The lower court acknowledged that there was no reported decision ap-
plying the First Amendment to a school sponsored play; consequently,
the district court relied by analogy on cases involving library censor-
ship and the suppression of student publications." Although the lower
court found those cases to be relevant, it concluded that "they address
problems quite distinct from that presented in this case. This is true
because the role of a school sponsored theatrical production .. .is
quite different from that of the library or of non-program related ex-
39. Id
40. The Third Circuit found no chilling effect because "no student was prohibited from
expressing views on any subject; no student was prohibited from reading the script, an uned-
ited version of which [remained] in the school library; and no one was punished or repri-
manded for any expression of ideas." Id
41. Id at 217 (quoting Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 432 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 454 U.S. 891 (1981)).
42. Id (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)). In a concurring opin-
ion, Judge Rosenn acknowledged that striking a balance between the need to expose stu-
dents to the "ideologies in the free marketplace of ideas, and.... the need to provide our
youth with a solid foundation of basic, moral values. . ." is difficult. 668 F.2d at 219. He
observed, however, that "[iut remains for this and other courts to evolve criteria for deter-
mining when constitutional values are so sharply implicated that judicial intervention is
necessary." Id Rosenn suggested the two criteria that should be considered are the nature
of the material being restricted and the intellectual development of the high school students
involved. Id
43. Id at 217.
44. 512 F. Supp. at 238.
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pressions of student opinion.'
4
The district court noted that the staff and administration viewed
the spring play as an "integral part of the school's educational pro-
gram"46 and as "intended to provide an educational experience."'47 In
adopting this reasoning, the Third Circuit stated:
[T]he selection of the artistic work to be given as the spring pro-
duction does not differ in principle from the selection of course
curriculum, a process which courts have traditionally left to the
expertise of educators. Just as a student has no First Amendment
right to study a particular aspect or period of history. . . he or
she has no First Amendment right to participate in the produc-
tion of a particular dramatic work or version thereof.48
Characterization of the play as part of the school "curriculum" is
inconsistent with accepted definitions of that term. "Curriculum" is
defined in Webster's New World Dictionary as a fixed series of studies
required for graduation or as all of the courses offered collectively by a
school.49 Under the first definition, courses in English and mathemat-
ics are part of the high school curriculum if attendance and participa-
tion are required to graduate. According to the second definition, a
drama course, although elective, still is considered part of the curricu-
lum since the course is offered by the school.
Participation in the spring production of Pippin was voluntary. 0
The play cannot be considered a course required for graduation, and
thus is not part of the curriculum under the first definition. Further, it
is arguable whether the play can be considered a "course offered in a
school." The lower court seemed to reject this contention when it re-
ferred to the play as an activity separate from the theater arts course.
Although credit for that course could be earned by participating in the
play,5" the district court indicated that the play was instead an extra-
curricular activity.52
The lower court also characterized the play as having "a direct tie
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. The lower court analyzed the relation of the play to the school's curriculum as
follows: "It is true that participation [in] and attendance [at the play] is voluntary and thus
depends on interest. This makes it no less a part of the school's educational program, how-
ever. Like elective courses, the spring production is designed to provide an educational
experience for those who choose to participate. At Caesar Rodney there is, in addition, a
direct tie to course curriculum. [The director of the play] teaches a course in theater arts and
students in that course are given credit for participation in one of the two. . . productions of
the year." 512 F. Supp. at 238 n.5.
48. 668 F.2d at 216 (quoting 512 F. Supp. at 238-39)(emphasis added).
49. WEBSTR's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 348 (2d college ed. 1968).
50. 512 F. Supp. at 238 n.5.
51. Id.
52. The district court noted that "it is true that participation [in the play] and attend-
ance is voluntary. . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
to course curriculum. '5 3 That description suggests that the court
viewed the play as separate from the curriculum since "tied to" the
curriculum does not convey the same meaning as "included in" that
curriculum. By ignoring the seeming contradiction, the lower court
was obliged to accept the judicial deference perspective as the proper
standard of review. 4
The Third Circuit "accepted the reasoning given by the district
court. ' 55 This acquiescence made it impossible for the circuit court to
confront squarely the issue of whether the students' freedom of expres-
sion had been unconstitutionally restricted. By characterizing the se-
lection of the play as a curriculum decision, the only precedent on
which the court could rely was that of judicial deference to administra-
tive curriculum decisions.56
The judicial deference approach merely requires a court to deter-
mine whether the board's action "directly and sharply implicate[d] ba-
sic constitutional values."" In making such a finding, a court need not
balance the students' interest in free expression with the school's inter-
ests. Further, even if a court undertook to balance these competing
interests, the judicial deference approach furnishes no guidelines-such
as identification of the school board's compelling governmental inter-
est-by which a court could determine whether a constitutional value
had been implicated. In light of the Supreme Court's admonition to
refrain from intervening in conflicts arising out of administrative deci-
sions,58 courts probably are reluctant to and perhaps feel precluded
from undertaking more than a cursory review of a student First
Amendment case. As a result, a decision based on the judicial defer-
ence rationale will be reached without the benefit of a thorough, dis-
passionate evaluation of the competing interests. First Amendment
questions deserve a more reasoned approach.
Seyfried exemplifies the problems inherent in the judicial defer-
ence rationale. The plaintiffs argued that even if the school board
should be permitted some "leeway" in determining the content of a
school production, the board had "overstepped the realm of reason and
53. Id
54. The Supreme Court indicated in Pico that school boards "might well defend their
claim of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate
community values." Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 (emphasis in original). This
statement indicates that had the play been characterized as an extra-curricular activity, judi-
cial deference to the school administrators would have been less compelling. The court
could then have considered the constitutional right at issue and used an analysis similar to
the Tinker test to balance the students' First Amendment rights against the interests prompt-
ing the board decision.
55. 668 F.2d at 215.
56. These decisions are discussed infra notes 126-67 and accompanying text.
57. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
58. Id
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acted arbitrarily and capriciously in this .. .instance." 59 Since
the judicial deference approach does not require a court to balance the
competing interests, the Third Circuit was not obligated to determine
whether the school board had a substantial and legitimate interest in
preventing the Pipin production.
The circuit court noted that administrators may not "so chill the
school's atmosphere for student and teacher expression that they cast a
pall of orthodoxy over the school community."6 The court found no
such danger in Seyfried because no student was prohibited from read-
ing the script or expressing any ideas. 1 Although relevant to evaluat-
ing potential First Amendment violations, the judicial deference
rationale does not specifically require that these or any other factors be
considered. Thus, the result in Seyfried is a decision not based on the
merits of the case, but on vague doctrine that-as will be demon-
strated-is unduly weighted in favor of school administrators. 2
III. Historical Development of Student First
Amendment Rights
Judicial recognition of student First Amendment rights is of fairly
recent origin. The majority of cases in which such rights were ac-
knowledged occurred after the 1968 Tinker decision.
In normal daily operations, the public school board and adminis-
tration have virtually unlimited control over curriculum, the manner in
which subject matter is to be presented, and the materials to be used in
the classroom.63 Courts do not review school administrative decisions
unless a student, parent, or teacher complains of an alleged violation;
in examining alleged violations of students' rights, the judiciary re-
mains deferential toward the educational expertise school authorities
are presumed to possess.' Courts are also reluctant to substitute their
judgments for those of the elected administrative body, which theoreti-
cally reflects a community's values.65
Courts are responsive when basic constitutional values are clearly
at issue.6  While recognizing the delicate and sometimes thankless
59. 512 F. Supp. at 239.
60. 668 F.2d at 216 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
61. 668 F.2d at 216.
62. See infra notes 217-28.
63. See Comment, Not on Our Shelves, supra note 3, at 101; Schauer, School Books,
Lesson Plans, and The Constitution, 78 W. VA. L. Rnv. 287, 305-06 (1976).
64. See Comment, Not on Our Shelves, supra note 3, at 102.
65. Note, First Amendment-Free Speech: Right to Know-Limit ofSchool Board's Dis-
cretion in Curricular Choice-Public School Library as Marketplace of Ideas, 27 CASE W.
Rs. L. REv. 1034, 1036 (1977).
66. See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976)
(in the absence of any explanation for board's removal of library books that were neutral in
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tasks facing school administrators, the Supreme Court has cautioned:
Boards of Education ... have ... important, delicate and
highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not per-
form within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educat-
ing the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount
important principles of our government as mere platitudes.
6 7
Inconsistent decisions, especially in the areas of library and curric-
ulum censorship, underscore the difficulties courts face in determining
the extent of student First Amendment rights in relation to the long-
accepted practice of deferring to school administrative decisions.
A. Pre-Tinker Decisions Upholding Challenges to State Regulation of
Education by Students' Parents
The first challenges to school board and administration control
over curriculum and school operations came not from students but
from parents demanding recognition of their interest in controlling the
education of their children.6" In 1923, the Supreme Court held uncon-
stitutional a state statute that prohibited teaching a subject in a foreign
language to pre-secondary school students. 9 Two years later, the
Court elaborated on the parents' parental right to control the education
of their children, holding that "[tihe child is not the mere creature of
the State; those who nurture him have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. ' ' 7 -
In 1972, parents successfully challenged a state educational statute
involving compulsory school attendance. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,7 a
group of Amish parents argued that enforcement of a statute requiring
classroom attendance by all students under the age of sixteen violated
the parents' right to limit their children's education to the completion
of the eighth grade. A majority of the Supreme Court balanced the
parents' interests in controlling the religious upbringing of their chil-
First Amendment terms, such removal was unconstitutional); Shanley v. Northeast Indep.
School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972) (school board policy prohibiting distribution of
printed documents unconstitutionally applied to students who distributed off-campus, un-
derground newspapers).
67. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (under the First
Amendment, public school children may not be compelled to salute the flag).
68. See Comment, Not on Our Shelves, supra note 3, at 103.
69. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
70. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (state law providing that no
child between the ages of eight and sixteen could attend a private school was
unconstitutional).
71. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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dren7 2 against the state's interest in compulsory education 3 and held
that the statute unconstitutionally infringed upon the parents' right to
free exercise of religion. 4
None of these cases established recognizable student First Amend-
ment rights in the area of curriculum; furthermore, none of the suc-
cessful parental challenges involved curriculum decisions.7 5 Such
decisions, even today, remain almost unassailable by students, teachers,
or parents.7 6 These cases, however, did provide precedents upon which
courts could rely when challenges to school board authority came from
students themselves.
B. The Tinker Decision-Recognition of Student First
Amendment Rights
The landmark case in the area of student First Amendment rights
is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.77 In
Tinker, the Supreme Court held that students possess First Amendment
rights, but those rights must be applied in light of the special circum-
stances of the schoolenvironment.78 The court recognized the right of
high school students to wear black armbands to school in protest of the
Vietnam War, and ruled that the regulations prohibiting such conduct
and authorizing suspensions for violating the regulations violated stu-
dents' right of expression. 79 The Court declared "[ilt can hardly be ar-
gued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."
80
The majority acknowledged that the wearing of armbands, unac-
companied by disorder or disturbance, was "akin to 'pure speech.' "81
72. It has been suggested that the Court also was greatly influenced by the fact that, in
addition to eight years of formal education, the home training provided by the Amish par-
ents made the children "both able citizens and productive members of society." J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 879 (1978).
73. See Meildejohn, supra note 15, at 1218.
74. In his dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the childrens' desires concerning their
education should be emphasized. 406 U.S. at 245-46.
75. See Comment, Not on Our Shelves, supra note 3, at 104-05.
76. See, e.g., Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d
289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972) (student plaintiffs); Berlan v. Board of Public
Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958) (teacher plaintiffs); Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 196 Misc. 542,
92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1949) (parent plaintiffs). See generally Nahmod, First Amendment Protec-
tion for Learning and Teaching: The Scope of Judicial Review, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1479,
1495-99 (1972); Comment, What Will We Tell the Children., supra note 4, at 974-86.
77. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Justice Fortas delivered the opinion of the Court.
78. Id. at 506.
79. Id at 514.
80. Id at 506.
81. Id. at 505, 508. For a discussion of the distinction between "pure speech" and other
forms of expression, see generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK, supra
note 72, at 718-28, 817-23.
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The Supreme Court then set forth the test for determining whether
school administrators constitutionally may prohibit such an expression
of opinion:
[School officials] must be able to show that [their] action was
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the dis-
comfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopu-
lar viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no
showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would "materi-
ally and substantially interfere with the requirements of appro-
priate discipline in the operation of the school," the prohibition
cannot be sustained. s2
The Court refined the test by adding that freedom of expression would
not be protected if it would "impinge upon the rights of other stu-
dents"8' 3 or if the school board could "forecast substantial disruption of
or material interference with school activities. ' 4 Finding that the facts
in Tinker could not reasonably have led authorities to fear substantial
disruption of school activities, the Supreme Court held that the school's
regulations were unconstitutional.8 5
To render its decision in Tinker, the Court need only have estab-
lished the test. The requirements of "material and substantial interfer-
ence with school discipline" and of "interference with the rights of
other students" appear to be sufficiently precise guidelines for applica-
tion in any situation involving student freedom of expression."6 Yet the
Court spoke further, and described in sweeping terms the role of educa-
tion in the classroom and the corresponding scope of student First
Amendment rights:
State-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism.
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their stu-
dents. Students in school as well as out of school are "persons"
under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental
rights which the State must respect. . . . Students may not be
regarded as closed circuit recipients of only that which the State
chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the ex-
pression of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the
absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to
82. Id at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
83. Id
84. Id at 514.
85. Id
86. Despite the fact that the Tinker test is clearly worded, at least one commentator has
indicated that courts have disagreed about its definition and scope: "One approach has been
to treat the 'threat of material and substantial disruption' like the 'clear and present danger'
test developed in sedition cases, and to require a rather high probability of serious disrup-
tion before expression may be curtailed. Most courts have been willing to allow greater
leeway to the determinations of school administrators, demanding that the finding be not
'clear and present,' but merely a 'reasonable forecast' before expression may be restricted."
Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 321, 352 (1979).
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regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expres-
sion of their views.
8 7
Tinker is significant partly because the Supreme Court indicated
that it was ready to recognize and uphold student freedom of expres-
sion in a number of circumstances.88 Thus, students have filed lawsuits
in circumstances factually unrelated to Tinker, based on the belief that
the broad pronouncements in the opinion supported their position.8 9
C. Application of Tinker in the Student Publication Cases
The student publications cases 90 reflect judicial efforts to recognize
and uphold student freedom of expression in light of Tinker. Yet the
cases also indicate continued adherence to the belief that there is a
"need for affirming the comprehensive authority of. . .school officials
. ..to prescribe and control conduct in the schools."9 1 In these cases,
students generally alleged that school policies requiring administrative
approval of publications constituted prior restraint, and thus im-
permissably restricted student freedom of expression.92
87. 393 U.S. at 511.
88. But cf Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948
(1971). In Guzick the Sixth Circuit upheld as constitutional the suspension of a seventeen-
year-old for refusing to remove a button soliciting participation in an anti-war demonstra-
tion. The issue before the court involved balancing the state's interest in avoiding disruption
of the classroom with the students' right of free expression. Although the same issue was
raised in Tinker, the Sixth Circuit distinguished Tinker on the grounds that the prohibition
against buttons was a long-standing, uniformly enforced rule applicable to all cause-sup-
porting buttons; in contrast, the prohibition in Tinker was an ad hoc response of a school
official. 431 F.2d at 597. Further, the school in Guzick had a history of racial disturbances
aggravated by racially inflammatory buttons. Id. at 596. Although the button at issue was
not related to race, the court cited administrative difficulties in distinguishing between per-
missible and impermissible buttons. Id. at 598-99. See also Project, Education and the Law,
supra note 29, at 1464-65.
89. See supra notes 5-6 and infra notes 90-103 & 123-92 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979); Trachtman v.
Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Baughman v.
Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973); Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th
Cir. 1972); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Eisner v.
Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971).
Since the Third Circuit distinguished Seyfried from the student publications cases, the
focus of this Note is confined to the type of freedom of expression case to which the Tinker
analysis has been applied.
91. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
92. A prior restraint is presumptively unconstitutional, and a heavy burden is placed on
the state in attempting to justify such an action. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 714 (1971). One of the dangers of prior restraint is that expression may be arbitrarily
censored on the basis of content. Once the state regulates on this basis, going beyond the
mere enforcement of reasonable time, place and manner restrictions, such action is constitu-
tionally suspect. Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1973).
The first post-Tinker publications case involved a complaint by
two high school students who were expelled after distributing in school
a newspaper they had written off-campus that was critical of school
policies and authorities.93 The Seventh Circuit stated that the mere
publication of criticism of school disciplinary procedures did not con-
stitute the Tinker test: there was not a "reasonable forecast" that sub-
stantial disruption in the school was imminent. 4 As a result, the court
ruled invalid the expulsion of the students.95 Subsequent cases, how-
ever, have reflected the prevailing judicial view that a system of prior
approval of high school publications is not unconstitutional per se; the
courts generally have reasoned that school officials have the "authority
to minimize or eliminate influences that would dilute or disrupt the
effectiveness of the educational process. ... ,96 In adopting this view,
the Fourth Circuit ruled that "school authorities may by appropriate
regulation exercise prior restraint upon publications distributed on the
school premises during school hours in those special circumstances
where they can "reasonably 'forecast substantial disruption of or mate-
rial interference with school activities" on account of the distribution of
such printed materials. . . .' 'I But not every court has agreed with
this application of Tinker.
98
Trachtman v. Anke 99 involved a different application of the Tinker
test. In Trachtman, staff members of a high school newspaper re-
quested administrative approval to distribute a questionnaire polling
students about their sexual preferences, knowledge, and experience.
The board of education denied the students' request on the ground that
"[m]atters dealing with sexuality could have serious consequences for
93. Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970).
94. Id. at 13.
95. Id at 15.
96. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 807 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Note,
Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate, supra note 7, at 795.
97. Baughman 478 F.2d at 1348 (quoting Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.
1971)).
98. In Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972), three high school
students were suspended for distributing on campus an underground newspaper they had
published without first obtaining approval from the general superintendent of schools. The
Seventh Circuit rejected the contention that Tinker permitted any system of prior approval
of publications; instead, the court held that the system at issue was unconstitutional, and that
this "conclusion is compelled by combining the holdings of Near P. Minnesota. . . and
Tinker. ... Tinker held that, absent a showing of material and substantial interference
with the requirements of school discipline, schools may not restrain the full First-Amend-
ment [sic] rights of their students. Near established one of those rights, freedom to distribute
a publication without censorship." Id at 1357.
Although Fujishima has not received broad support, it is an example of thoughtful and
innovative post-Tinker decisionmaking in the student First Amendment rights area.
99. 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977).
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the well being of the individual."'" The Second Circuit held that the
board's decision did not violate the students' First Amendment
rights.' 0 ' The Second Circuit ruled that the school authorities were ex-
perienced and knowledgeable in matters involving the psychological
well being of students; therefore, the court concluded that the board
had a substantial basis for predicting that "distribution of the question-
naire would result in significant emotional harm to a number of stu-
dents."' °2  The court of appeals relied not on the "material or
substantial influence" aspect of the Tinker test, but on the portion of
the test relating to "colliding with the rights of others."'1
0 3
Tinker and its progeny can be viewed as evidence of judicial recog-
nition of the conflict between student freedom of expression and the
state's interest in inculcating students with socially sanctioned values.
The Tinker test is one effort to minimize the conflict by providing a
standard against which such interests can be weighed.
D. Library Censorship Cases
L The Right to Know; The Right to Receive Information
Students in the library censorship cases' °4 generally have argued
that removal of books from the school curriculum or library violates
their First Amendment rights. The particular right in issue has been
designated the "right to receive information" or the "right to know."'0 5
The right to know evolved from a series of cases unrelated to edu-
cation in which the Supreme Court recognized the right of willing re-
cipients to receive information.106 In 1943, the Supreme Court
invalidated on First Amendment grounds an ordinance that prohibited
100. Id. at 515.
101. Id. at 519-20.
102. Id. at 520.
103. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. The court in Trachtman stated, "although this case involves
a situation where the potential disruption is psychological rather than physical, Tinker and
its progeny hold that the burden is on the school officials to demonstrate that there was
reasonable cause to believe that distribution of the questionnaire would have caused signifi-
cant psychological harm to some of the Stuyvesant students." Trachtman, 563 F.2d at 517.
104. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union
High School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); Zykan v. Warsaw Community
School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980); Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541
F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25,457
F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979);
Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm. of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass.
1978).
105. See Comment, Not on Our Shelves, supra note 3, at 113. In the educational context,
this right has also been characterized as the "right to read." Id.
106. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of the right to know, see Comment, Not
on Our Shelves, supra note 3, and Recent Developments- Removal of Public School Library
Books: The First Amendment Versus the Local School Board, 34 VAND. L. Rnv. 1407 (1981).
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door to door distribution of religious literature.10 7 The Court deter-
mined that the ordinance failed to distinguish between those persons
wishing to receive the information and those who did not. 0 8 After rec-
ognizing that freedom of speech "embraces the right to distribute litera-
ture. . . and necessarily protects the right to receive it,"' 9 the Court
held that the statute impermissibly conflicted with the distributors'
freedoms of speech and press."1
0
Twenty-two years later, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
a federal act which required that the postal service detain "communist
political propaganda" and deliver it only after the addressee, upon no-
tification of detention of the material, requested it by means of a reply
card."' The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because
the requirement of returning the reply card was "a limitation on the
unfettered exercise of the addressee's First Amendment rights."I" The
Court did not expressly rely on the right to receive information. In his
concurring opinion, however, Justice Brennan declared: "The right to
receive publications is. . .a fundamental right. The dissemination of
ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not
free to receive and consider them.""' 3
The right to receive information was recognized explicitly in 1969.
In Stanley v. Georgia, " the Supreme Court overturned a Georgia pe-
nal statute proscribing the knowing possession of obscene material. In
doing so, the Court declared that the "right to receive information and
ideas regardless of their social worth, . . . is fundamental to our free
society." I ' Following Stanley, the Court has recognized that there is a
right to access of information for those who listen to public broad-
casts' 6 and for intended recipients of letters written by prison
inmates.1
7
Perhaps the Supreme Court's strongest affirmation of the right to
receive information is in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc."8 Consumers of prescription drugs
brought a class action challenging the validity of a Virginia statute
which provided that a licensed pharmacist who advertised the prices of
107. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
108. Id at 147-49.
109. Id at 143.
110. Id at 149.
111. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
112. Id at 305.
113. Id at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
114. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
115. Id at 564.
116. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
117. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974).
118. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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prescription drugs would be guilty of unprofessional conduct." 9 The
Court invalidated the statute on the ground that it infringed upon the
rights of consumers who wished to receive the advertisements in ques-
tion.' 20 The Court reasoned that "[flreedom of speech presupposes a
willing speaker. But where a speaker exists. . . the protection afforded
is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both."''
In Virginia State Board, the Court firmly established the right of
an individual to sue when a state action has violated that person's First
Amendment right to receive information. Student plaintiffs have
seized upon this right as a basis for contesting the removal of books
from their libraries and curriculum.'
22
2. Pre-Pico Library Censorship Cases
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Board of Education
v. Pico,'2 3 courts lacked a standard by which they could balance stu-
dents' First Amendment rights against the right of school boards to
mandate the curriculum. As a result, courts produced contradictory
decisions regarding whether the removal of books from school libraries
violated students' First Amendment rights. Formulation of a standard
in this area probably was inhibited by reliance on the Supreme Court's
exhortation in Epperson that the judiciary should refrain from interven-
ing in the daily operations of school systems. 24 Eventually, the Sixth
Circuit developed a balancing test to weigh student and state interests
in the library censorship area; 25 that test subsequently was modified
and applied in other pre-Pico cases.
The first case to address the issue of library censorship was Presi-
dents Council, District 25 v. Community School Board No. 25.126 In
Presidents Council, students alleged that removal of the book Down
These Mean Streets27 from the district's junior high school libraries
28
infringed their First Amendment rights. The court reasoned that since
119. Id. at 749-50.
120. Id at 770. Recognition of their right to receive information guaranteed that the
plaintiffs in Virginia State Bd had standing to maintain the lawsuit. Id. at 757.
121. Id at 756 (footnote omitted).
122. Comment, Not on Our Shelves, supra note 3, at 116. One commentator has sug-
gested that, in light of Tinker, litigation involving the right to receive information in the high
school environment was inevitable. Recent Developments, supra note 106, at 1415.
123. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
124. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
125. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 580 (6th Cir. 1976).
126. 457 F.2d 289 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
127. The book is an autobiography by Piri Thomas that details life growing up in the
Spanish Harlem area of New York City. The book deals with sex, drugs, violence and
profanity. 457 F.2d at 291.
128. Prior to the trial, the school board returned the book to the libraries but permitted
the loan of the book only to parents of students. Id at 290.
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the state legislature had given the school board responsibility for selec-
tion of library materials, "we do not consider it appropriate . . . to
review either the wisdom or the efficacy of the determinations of the
Board."' 29 The court ruled that the board's interest in selecting and
removing library books far outweighed the students' claim of First
Amendment protection.13 0 Relying on the Supreme Court's admoni-
tion in Epperson to refrain from intervening in school conflicts unless
basic constitutional values were directly and sharply implicated, the
court held that there had been no "impingement" on protected student
rights.
13 1
In Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District,32 the Sixth Circuit
reached a strikingly different result from that reached by the Seventh
Circuit in Presidents Council. Students in Minarcini claimed that the
school board had violated their First Amendment rights by refusing to
approve certain books as texts and by removing another book from the
library.'33 In rendering its decision, the Sixth Circuit distinguished be-
tween book selection and book removal. The court noted that discre-
tion in the selection of textbooks "must be lodged somewhere,"' 34 and
ruled that there was no constitutional prohibition that prevented this
discretion from being vested in the school board.'3 Thus, the board
violated no constitutional precept by exercising its power to select
either textbooks or course curriculum.
136
The Sixth Circuit, however, refused to read the decision in Presi-
dents Council as "upholding an absolute right on the part of this school
board to remove from the library and presumably to destroy any books
it regarded unfavorably without concern for the First Amendment."'' 37
The court of appeals identified the First Amendment right at issue as
129. Id at 291.
130. Id
131. Id at 291-92. In his dissent to the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, Justice
Douglas argued that the First Amendment included a "right to hear, to learn [and] to
know." 409 U.S. at 999 (Douglas, J., dissenting). "The First Amendment is a preferred
right and is of great importance in the schools. . . .What else can the School Board now
decide it does not like? How else will its sensibilities be offended? Are we sending children
to school to be educated by the norms of the School Board or are we educating our youth to
shed the prejudice of the past, to explore all forms of thought, and to find solutions to our
world's problems?" Id at 999-1000.
132. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
133. The books denied approval as either texts or library books were Catch 22 by Joseph
Heller and God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater by Kurt Vonnegut. Id at 579. The board also
ordered the removal of Vonnegut's Cat's Cradle from the library shelves. Id
134. Id.
135. Id
136. Id at 580. In upholding the school board's exercise of discretion in book selection,
the court stated that it had "[kept] in mind the admonitions of the United States Supreme
Court in the leading case of Epperson v. Arkansas. ... " Id
137. Id. at 581.
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"the right of students to receive information which they and their
teachers desire them to have."1 38 The court recognized that books
could legitimately be removed because they had become worn out or
obsolete, or because lack of shelf space required their disposal.
39
Given "the absence of any explanation of the Board's action which is
neutral in First Amendment terms,"'140 the court concluded that the
books were removed because the board found them objectionable for
reasons related solely to their social or political tastes.' 4 1 The court
therefore held that the board's removal of the book from the library
was unconstitutional.
42
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Minarcini represents the first depar-
ture from the traditional view that the judiciary should avoid interven-
ing in confficts arising out of the exercise of administrative discretion in
curriculum matters. It is also the first student plaintiff case to recognize
and uphold the high school student's "right to know" as that right was
set out by the Supreme Court in Virginia State Board
143
Minarcini was followed by two district court cases in which the
defendant school authorities relied on Presidents Council as support for
unconstrained authority to remove reading material from school li-
brary shelves. In Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Commit-
tee,'" students claimed that their First Amendment rights had been
violated when the school committee removed an anthology of writings
by adolescents. 45 The district court ruled that the committee's reliance
on Presidents Council presumed incorrectly that the holding there af-
forded school authorities the absolute right to remove a book "without
any concern for the First Amendment rights of students and
faculty."' 146 The court observed that absent a book's obsolescence, im-
proper selection, or limitations on resources such as money and shelf
space, there are boundaries to the committee's authority to remove
books from the library. 47 The trial court determined that the book had
been banned only because "it considered the theme and language of
138. Id. at 583.
139. Id. at 581.
140. Id. at 582.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
144. 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
145. Id. at 713. The anthology is entitled Male andFemale Under 18. The poem at issue
is The City to a Young Girl by a 15 year old Brooklyn girl. Id. at 704-05.
The school committee is a seven member body that has statutory authority to adminis-
ter the Chelsea public school system. Id at 705 n.3.
146. Id. at 711.
147. Id.
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[one of the selections of the anthology] to be offensive."' 148
The rationale expressed by the district court in Right to Readis an
important development in the analytical evolution of the library cen-
sorship cases. The court acknowledged the Epperson warning, but de-
cided that when ruling on book removals, the committee's action must
be neutral in First Amendment terms.149 Once the district court found
that First Amendment values were involved, it applied a standard
based on the test developed in Tinker
When First Amendment values are implicated, the local officials
removing the book must demonstrate some substantial and legiti-
mate government interest. Tinker does not require the Commit-
tee to demonstrate that the book's presence in the library was a
threat to school discipline, but it does stand for the proposition
that an interest comparable to school discipline must be at
stake.1
50
Finding that no substantial governmental interest was served in remov-
ing the anthology, the court held that the students' "right to read and
be exposed to controversial thoughts and language . . .,15 had been
unconstitutionally infringed.
In Salvail v. Nashua Board of Education,52 the district court of
New Hampshire-relying on the test enunciated in Right to Read-
held that the defendant school board failed to demonstrate a sufficient
governmental interest to warrant removal of MS. magazine from a
high school library.1 53 The school board adduced Presidents Councilas
support for the board's absolute right to remove any book it considered
inappropriate irrespective of the student First Amendment rights. 54 In
rejecting this argument the court suggested that a high school library is
a " 'forum for silent speech,' ,155 with books serving as the communica-
tion and students serving as the recipients.' 56 Since the right to receive
information is protected by the First Amendment,"5 7 "school authori-
ties must bear the burden of showing a substantial government interest
148. Id. The court noted that at trial the school committee members referred to The City
to a Young Girl as "filthy," "obscene" and "disgusting." Id
149. I. The district court apparently accepted the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Minarcini
that school committees enjoy greater discretion in book selection than in book removal. See
id
150. Id at 713 (citations omitted).
151. Id at 714.
152. 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979).
153. Id at 1275.
154. Id at 1273-74.
155. Id at 1274 (quoting Note, First Amendment Limitations on the Power of School
Boards to Select and Remove High School Text and Library Books, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
457, 471 (1978)).
156. Id
157. See supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
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to be served" in justifying a restriction on that right.
158
Two 1980 library censorship cases reached decisions that were in-
consistent with the results in Minarcini, Right to Read, and Salvai. In
Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corporation,'59 the Seventh Cir-
cuit stated that the students' complaint alleging that their constitutional
rights had been violated by the removal of books from English courses
did not state a constitutional cause of action. 160 The court recognized
that students possess qualified rights to academic freedom and to re-
ceive information, but held that application of these rights are limited
at the secondary school level by the students' intellectual development
and the inculcative nature of the school system.161 The court of appeals
reasoned that the need for educational guidance predominates over
many of the rights and interests protected by academic freedom, and,
quoting from Epperson, reiterated the need for broad discretionary
powers for school authorities in this area.
62
The Seventh Circuit summarized its ruling as follows:
"[C]omplaints filed by secondary school students to contest the educa-
tional decisions. . . are sometimes cognizable but generally must cross
a relatively high threshold before entering upon the field of a constitu-
tional claim suitable for . . . litigation."' 63 The court concluded that
the plaintiffs' complaint had not met this threshold because it failed to
allege that the school board systematically had tried to exclude a par-
ticular type of thought or an identifiable ideological preference.
64
The Second Circuit in Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School
Board of Directors16 also declined to apply either the Minarcini or
Right to Read approaches. In Bicknell, students alleged that the board's
removal of two books from the school library violated the students'
First Amendment rights on the ground that the action was motivated
by the "personal tastes and values" of the board members.' 66 Although
the Second Circuit recognized that students' rights should be protected
when removal of books creates the risk of suppressing ideas, the court
158. 469 F. Supp. at 1274 (quoting Note, supra note 155, at 471).
159. 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
160. Id at 1304. The court also rejected the argument that the school's failure to rehire
certain teachers violated the students' constitutional rights. Id. at 1307.
161. Id. at 1304.
162. Id. at 1305.
163. Id. at 1306.
164. Id at 1306-07.
165. 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980). Bicknellwas decided the same day as Pico v. Board of
Educ., 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980). In Pico, however, the Second Circuit found that material
fact issues existed about whether the board's removal of books from the high school library
was "politically motivated" and precluded summary judgement. Pico, 638 F.2d at 407, 417.
There was no finding of a political motivation in Bicknell.
166. 631 F.2d at 441. Dog Day Afternoon and The Wanderers were removed from the
library.
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concluded that if the materials removed are "permissibly considered to
be vulgar or indecent, it is no cause for legal complaint that the Board
members applied their own standards of taste about vulgarity."'
' 67
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, contradictory decisions and
rationales were the norm in the pre-Pico library censorship cases. The
Sixth Circuit in Minarcin4 and the district courts in Right to Read and
Salvail, recognized a student right to receive information, and indicated
that protection of that right warranted a departure from the judicial
tendency to refrain from interfering in school curriculum conflicts.
Those courts employed a standard similar to the Tinker test used in the
student freedom of expression cases: the school authorities must show
a substantial, legitimate governmental interest if First Amendment val-
ues are implicated.
On the other hand, the Seventh and Second Circuits in Presidents
Council, Bicknell and Zykan relied heavily on the language in Epperson
cautioning against judicial interference in day-to-day operations. The
courts in those cases neither found a violation of student First Amend-
ment rights nor expressly recognized the right of students to receive
information. It was not until 1982 that the Supreme Court addressed
the conflict in the reasoning and holdings of the lower courts in library
censorship cases.
3. The Supreme Court Considers School Library Censorshp." Board of
Education v. Pico
In Board of Education v. Pico,' a politically conservative parents'
organization alleged that the district's school libraries contained eleven
books that were "objectionable" and "improper fare for school stu-
dents." 16 9 Upon review, the school board determined that the books
were "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain
filthy";' 70 the board then appointed a parent-teacher review committee
to decide which books should be permanently removed from the librar-
ies.171 The committee recommended that two books be removed and
that a third be made available to students with parental approval;
nonetheless, the board decided to remove nine of the original' eleven
books and to make one book available only with parental approval.1
72
167. Id
168. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). A detailed analysis of the Pico decision is beyond the scope of
this Note. The purpose in discussing Pico in this Note is to examine the rationale currently
applicable in library censorship cases.
169. Id at 856.
170. Id. at 857.
171. Id
172. Id at 857-58. The books removed were: Slaughter House Five; The Naked Ape;
Down These Mean Streets; Best Short Stories by Negro Writers; Go Ask 4ice; Laughing
Boy; Black Boy; A Hero Ain't Nothing But a Sandwich; and Soul on Ice. Id at 856 n.3.
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The students responded by filing a complaint alleging that the board's
action violated their First Amendment rights. The case eventually was
appealed to the Supreme Court.
173
Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court.7 4 Bren-
nan stated the issue before the Court did not involve the constitutional
limitations on the state's power to control school curriculum, but
whether the First Amendment imposed any limitations upon the dis-
cretion of the board to remove books from school libraries."7 5 He
noted that the courts should not intervene in the resolution of conflicts
arising out of a school's daily operations unless "'basic constitutional
values' are 'directly and sharply implicate[dI' in those conflicts."' 76 He
added, however, that "First Amendment rights of students may be di-
rectly and sharply implicated by the removal of books from the shelves
of a school library."17 7 Recognizing that the "Constitution protects the
right to receive information and ideas,"17 Justice Brennan observed
that this right is particularly important for students soon to be adult
members of society.' 79 The special characteristics of a school library, a
place in which students can be "free to inquire, to study and to evaluate
.. ,,,8o make that environment "especially appropriate for the recog-
nition of the First Amendment rights of students."' 8'
Justice Brennan rejected the school board's claim of absolute dis-
cretion to remove library books and asserted that whether the removal
of books denies students their First Amendment rights depended on the
board's motivation behind its action.' 2 If the board intended to deny
173. The district court granted summary judgment for the board, stating that the board
had only restricted access to books it had found vulgar. 474 F. Supp. 387, 397 (E.D.N.Y.
1979). The Second Circuit reversed. 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980). One of the judges con-
cluded that, at the summary judgment stage, the board had not sufficiently justified its ac-
tion. 638 F.2d at 414-15. The other member of the majority felt that the case turned on the
factual issue of whether the board's decision was motivated by the permissible desire to
remove books containing vulgarities, or the impermissible desire to suppress ideas. 638 F.2d
at 436-38 (Newman, J., concurring).
174. Justices Marshall and Stevens joined in the plurality opinion in its entirety. Justice
Blackmun joined in Brennan's opinion except on the issue of the students' right to receive
information and how the right at issue was "somehow associated with the peculiar nature of
the school library." 457 U.S. at 877-78 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment and dis-
senting in part). Blackmun suggested instead that certain forms of state discrimination be-
tween ideas are improper; however, "the State may not act to deny access to an idea simply
because state officials disapprove of that idea for partisan or political reasons." Id
175. 457 U.S. at 861-62. Justice Brennan specifically stated that the case did not involve
decisions regarding textbooks, curriculum or the acquisition of library books. Id.
176. Id. at 866 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
177. 457 U.S. at 861-62.
178. Id. at 867 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
179. 457 U.S. at 868.
180. Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
181. 457 U.S. at 868.
182. Id. at 871.
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students access to ideas with which the board disagreed, and if this
intent was the decisive factor in the decision to remove the books, the
students' rights were violated. 183 If, on the other hand, the books were
removed solely because they were "pervasively vulgar" or education-
ally unsuitable, their removal would be "perfectly permissible."'
' 8 4
Having enunciated these guidelines, the plurality remanded the case to
the lower court to determine the basis of the board's motivation in re-
moving the books.
One significant aspect of the Pico decision is that a plurality of the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that students have a right to receive
information, at least in the environment of the school library. How-
ever, since student First Amendment rights will be construed in light of
the special characteristics of the school environment, 85 school authori-
ties still possess considerable discretion to choose the contents of those
libraries. As long as that discretion is not exercised in a narrowly parti-
san or political manner, Pico authorizes school boards to continue to
decide what information students have a "right" to receive. Further-
more, even this limited right does not extend into the classroom.
18 6
The Court's effort to restrict the decision to library book removal" 87-
and its failure to discuss whether a school board must show "proper
motivation" before it exercises its discretion in the areas of curriculum
control or book acquisition-limits the effectiveness of the Pico
decision.
The utility of Pico is also limited because the plurality opinion
provides no clear guidelines for determining when proper motivation
lies behind a decision to remove library books. The Court suggested
that lack of "educational suitability"'8 8 and the presence of




185. Id at 866 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). See also Seyfried, 668 F.2d at'216.
186. 457 U.S. at 861-62.
187. Justice Brennan stated: "We emphasize at the outset the limited nature of the sub-
stantive question presented by the case before us. . . . [Ilt does not involve textbooks...
or.. .any books that.. . students would be required to read. Respondents do not seek
• ..to impose limitations upon their school board's discretion to prescribe the curric-
ula. . . . [Tihe only books at issue. . . are library books, books that by their nature are
optional... reading .... Our adjudication of the present case thus does not intrude into
the classroom, or into the compulsory courses taught there. Furthermore, even as to library
books, the action before us does not involve the acquisition of books. . . .The only action
challenged... is the removal from school libraries of books originally placed there by the
school authorities . Id (emphasis in original).
188. Id at 871.
189. Id
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The Court ignored the viability of the Right to Read test, which
would have required the board to show a substantial and material in-
terest for removing a book if students' First Amendment rights were
implicated. 90 "Proper motivation" does not necessarily require the
same level of proof as a showing of substantial and material interest.
For example, a school board has an interest in "inculcat[ing] . . .both
knowledge and social values" in its students. 91 Thus, administrators
may be "properly motivated" in removing Pippin from the school li-
brary if the members feel that the treatment of premarital sex in the
script lacks "educational suitability" for young people. Yet, the belief
that Pippin is inappropriate fare for high school students does not
demonstrate an interest "comparable to school discipline,"' 92 as the
Right to Read standard requires. As a result, the Pico "proper motiva-
tion" test leaves school administrators great discretion and places them
in a preferred position when their interests in education are balanced
against students' First Amendment rights.
After Pico, courts remain free to refrain from interfering in dis-
putes arising out of curriculum decisions unless constitutional values
clearly are implicated. Given the deference courts historically have
shown to school administrative decisions, judges are not likely to per-
ceive Pico as signalling a trend toward comprehensive judicial investi-
gation of those decisions under the First Amendment.
IV. Another Approach to Student First Amendment Rights
In his concurring opinion in Seyfried, Judge Rosenn observed that
the dispute arose from the "inherent tension" between two essential
functions of the educational process: "exposing young minds to the
clash of ideologies in the free marketplace of ideas, and. . . the need
to provide our youth with a solid foundation of basic moral values
... ,,1 These two functions form the basis of the prevailing theories
regarding the role of education in this country.
A. The Competing Theories of Education
The original justification for school board authority over the stu-
dent was derived from the common law doctrine of in locoparenti.
1 94
The rationale underlying this theory is that since school attendance was
voluntary, parents impliedly had delegated authority over their chil-
dren to school officials. The advent of compulsory education undercut
the theory because school attendance could no longer be said to imply
190. See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
191. Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d at 432 (Newman, J., concurring).
192. Right to Read, 454 F. Supp. at 713.
193. 668 F.2d at 219.
194. See Comment, M/hat Will We Tell the ChildrenP, supra note 4, at 962.
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parental delegation of authority to the school.19
More recently, the indoctrination theory of education-what
Judge Rosenn termed "the need to provide our youth with a solid foun-
dation of basic moral values"196-- appears to have commanded the
most support among educators and courts as being descriptive of the
role of education in America. The theory is that
[t]he interest of the state in promoting the efficient operation of its
schools extends beyond merely securing an orderly class-
room. . . . [A] principal function of all elementary and secon-
dary education is indoctrinative-whether it be to teach the
ABC's or multiplication tables or to transmit the basic values of
the community. 
97
Proponents of this theory argue against the presentation of controver-
sial ideas in the classroom, advocating instead a traditional curricu-
lum.198 Since most of the authority for curriculum matters has been
"expressly delegated to local school boards or sustained on an implied
delegation of powers theory,"' 9 9 the curriculum has become "an effec-
tive instrument of socialization to the norms of the community, at least
as these are perceived by the educational decision-makers."'
The other prominent educational theory is the "open classroom"
model. Advocates of that theory believe that the school must operate
as a "free marketplace of ideas":
Under this model, the child is presented with objective concep-
tions of divergent viewpoints and theories, and thereby given the
opportunity to determine for himself, with appropriate parental
guidance, the validity of various positions. . . . [T]he child ac-
tively considers and chooses from among diverse views. . . . It
is inevitable that the student will be exposed to differing views in
some context, whether it be a class, media, or personal encounter,
and therefore it can be argued that the school is the preferable
arena for exposure, the child there having the benefit of the
teacher's objective guidance.2"'
The purpose of education, according to this theory, is to stimulate stu-
dents' reasoning abilities by exposing them to various viewpoints, thus
fostering the ability to make reasoned choices.
195. See id.
196. Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d at 219 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
197. Seyfried, 512 F. Supp. at 238.
198. See Comment, Wfhat Will We Tell the Children4 supra note 4, at 963.
199. See Project, Education and the Law, supra note 29, at 1424.
200. Id
201. Comment, *hat i11 We Tell the Children P supra note 4, at 963-64.
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B. Judicial Attitudes Toward the Function of Education
Conflicting decisions in student First Amendment rights cases are
evidence that the courts have had considerable difficulty in determining
the proper role of education. Some courts have recognized that both
the indoctrination and the marketplace of ideas approaches have a role
to play in the high school classroom. °2 Even so, the judiciary's inabil-
ity to choose between the competing theories of education has pro-
duced inconsistent decisions in the student First Amendment cases.20 3
A court's adherence to one of these theories usually is a compelling
consideration in the resolution of a dispute involving student First
Amendment freedoms.
2 4
Although some courts have conceded that the marketplace of ideas
concept has some viability in secondary education, most have been un-
willing to give that approach an exclusive endorsement. 20 5  Even
among those courts that have upheld student freedom of expression
and the right to know, the Epperson admonition against judicial in-
volvement in day to day school operations retains vitality.206 The judi-
ciary apparently is not willing to accept an educational model that
allows high school students and teachers complete freedom to discuss
controversial ideas.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the concept of a market-
place of ideas 7 applies to education, at least at the university level. In
1957, the Court stated that "[t]he essentiality of freedom in the commu-
nity of American universities is almost self-evident. . . . Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate,
to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will
stagnate and die."2 8 Three years later, the Supreme Court declared
that the state has a "vital concern" in insuring the fitness of teachers
who "shap[e] the attitude of young minds toward the society in which
202. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-
07 (1969); Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 412-13 (2d Cir. 1980); Thomas v. Board of
Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1049-50 (2d Cir. 1979); Seyfried v. Walton, 512 F. Supp. 235, 237-38
(D. Del. 1981).
203. See Comment, What Will We Tell the Children-" supra note 4, at 969.
204. Id. at 964. For a detailed review of judicial decisions concerning the proper func-
tion of education in the classroom, and of the alternative approaches available, see id. at
964-71.
205. Id. at 968.
206. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. at 863-64; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. at 507; Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm.
of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. at 711.
207. The marketplace of ideas concept was set out by Justice Holmes in Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting): "[T]he ultimate good de-
sired is better reached by free trade in ideas ... the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."
208. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
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they live." 209 The Court, however, also stressed that "[t]he vigilant pro-
tection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools." 210  In Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents,211 the Court spoke even more expansively in support of the
"marketplace" concept of education:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic free-
dom, which is of transcendent value to all of us. . . . That free-
dom is . . . a special concern of the First Amendment, which
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the class-
room. . . . The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of
ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than
through any kind of authoritative selection."
This broad judicial acceptance of the marketplace of ideas concept
may be limited to the university level2113 The Supreme Court generally
has recognized that boards of education fulfill "important, delicate, and
highly discretionary functions," 2 14 but it nonetheless has cautioned that
[since the boards] are educating the young for citizenship [it] is
reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of
the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source
and teach youth to discount important principles of our govern-
ment as mere platitudes.
215
Similarly, in Tinker, the Court indicated that the marketplace of ideas
concept is somewhat viable at the secondary level: "[S]tudents may not
be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State
chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the expression
of those sentiments that are officially approved.
21 6
C. An Alternative Approach: A More Open Classroom for High
School Students
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the validity of the market-
place of ideas concept of education at the university level, and has rec-
ognized, to a certain extent, the applicability of that concept to the high
school setting. Lower courts, therefore, would not be remiss in ruling
209. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960) (quoting Adler v. Board of Educ., 342
U.S, 485, 493 (1952)).
210. 364 U.S. at 487.
211. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
212. Id at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
213. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
214. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
215. Id
216. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
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that the indoctrination theory of education is not only inappropriate"'
but also too restrictive of First Amendment rights when applied to stu-
dents at the secondary level.
A shift to the marketplace of ideas theory-with some limita-
tions-would provide high school students with greater exposure to the
conflicting ideas and values that they will confront after graduation.
Contact with a variety of thoughts and beliefs is important for individ-
ual development.2"' Protecting such exposure implicitly recognizes
that students have a right to receive information. Concern about stu-
dents' unrestricted access to all information available in the "market-
place" could be alleviated by the teacher's presence as moderator.
With the teacher available, students will be afforded an opportunity to
practice their reasoning abilities and profit from the teacher's guidance.
By developing students' critical and judgmental abilities, the mar-
ketplace of ideas model would permit greater freedom of expression.
Freedom of speech performs an "instrumental role in a child's growth
toward autonomy" 219 in several ways. It allows the student to "experi-
ence the satisfaction that results from self-expression." 22 It also offers
opportunities to practice the "skills of rational discourse: the weighing
of evidence, persuasion, [and] the technique of patient listening."2'
Further, the right of free speech demonstrates to students the "potential
of speech to accomplish good or bad results.
' 222
As an adolescent grows older, his analytical abilities improve. It
has been suggested that by the age of fourteen
the moral and intellectual maturity of a child approaches that of
an adult. Without trying to define exactly what the age may be,
217. It has been suggested that students in the first through sixth grades, and, to a lesser
extent, junior high school, are impressionable, immature, and lack the intellectual capability
to determine objectively the merits of divergent and controversial viewpoints. See Com-
ment, What Will We Tell the Children;" supra note 4, at 969. Therefore, the indoctrination
function is considered paramount in the elementary schools. Id. at 971. Perhaps it is appro-
priate for the school administrators to determine which values and concepts are proper fare
for these students.
The indoctrination theory, however, fails to recognize that as students reach high
school, it is reasonable to assume that their intellectual and judgmental capabilities have
sharpened and expanded. Consequently, there is less need to emphasize basic values and
traditional subjects. Id. Based on this assumption, the marketplace of ideas theory is the
more appropriate approach to secondary education; high school students should be exposed
to a wider range of ideas, and, under a teacher's guidance, should be given the freedom to
analyze and explore those ideas.
218. Garvey, Children and the First Amendment supra note 86, at 349.
219. Id. at 347.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 348.
222. Id. It has been suggested that freedom of expression provides a student with an
"opportunity to become acquainted with the effects words and symbols can have ... Id.
at 365.
such evidence surely suggests that we may not exclude a minor
altogether from the adult realm of free discussion. Nor may we
ignore the educational import of so treating the child as to de-
velop the powers of independent thought . *.. 223
Thus, the age and maturity of high school students supports the shift
from the indoctrination to the open classroom theory of education.224
Among the reasons education is important is that it indoctrinates
students with the proper cultural values; yet, it also serves the impor-
tant state interest in protecting and developing a student's budding
abilities to inquire and analyze, qualities that produce good citizens.
Recognizing these goals, the Supreme Court has stated that education
is "a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment.
' 225
Another factor supporting a shift from the indoctrination to the
marketplace of ideas theory at the high school level is the diversity of
ideas and information to which the students are exposed outside the
classroom. Adolescents have ready access to newspapers, music, televi-
sion, and motion pictures, all of which bombard teenagers with a myr-
iad of values and ideas. Such exposure fosters confusion in a student,
with a corresponding need to decide which ideas to accept and which to
discard. Some courts have recognized as futile educators' attempts to
limit the discussion of certain ideas deemed inappropriate for secon-
dary students when those same values are much in evidence beyond the
schoolhouse gate.226 Preventing all discussion of and exposure to con-
223. Meiklejohn, supra note 15, at 1220.
224. In his concurrence in Seyfried, Judge Rosenn suggested that the court could take
judicial notice of the "progressively higher levels of intellectual and emotional development
of students in the later grades of secondary school." 668 F.2d at 219. He stated, "High
school students, in contrast, are at an age approaching both adulthood and franchise ...
It would be foolhardy to shield our children from political debate and issues until the eve of
their first venture into the voting booth. Schools must. . . preparfe] these students to think
and analyze and to recognize the demagogue." Id at 220 (quoting James v. Board of Educ.,
461 F.2d 566, 574 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972)).
225. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The court has also observed:
"The importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as
citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long has been
recognized. ... Ombach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979).
226. For example, in Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969), the court con-
fronted the issue whether a teacher could, for demonstrated educational purposes, "quote a
'dirty' word currently used in order to give special offense, or whether the shock is too great
for high school seniors to stand." Id at 361. The First Circuit concluded, "If the answer
were that students must be protected from such exposure, we would fear for their future."
Id at 362.
The Seventh Circuit, in discussing the effect of the statement "Oral sex may prevent
tooth decay," observed that "[t]his attempt to amuse comes as a shock to an older genera-
tion. But today's students in high school are not insulated from the shocking but legally
accepted language used by demonstrators and protestors in streets and on campuses and by
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troversial subjects in the school runs counter to the state's interest in
producing well-informed, capable, and analytical adults.22
Secondary education could better serve state interests by recogniz-
ing its students' right to receive information. That right is necessary to
train high school students to think, analyze, and discriminate. Without
full First Amendment protection, students may be deprived of either
the tools or the experience to deal with the controversies that inevitably
follow graduation. As the Supreme Court has declared, "The Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to [a] ro-
bust exchange of ideas."22
Whether or not educators are ready to accept the open classroom
theory of education for secondary students, courts should expand stu-
dent First Amendment rights. Following the Supreme Court's lead in
Tinker, the judiciary should free itself from using the judicial deference
rationale. In light of the age, maturity, and social awareness of high
school youth, courts should give heightened recognition to the market-
place of ideas concept.
V. A Better Approach to Seyfried
The Third Circuit erred in classifying the selection of the school
play as a curriculum decision. 229 That error was compounded when
the Third Circuit upheld the lower court's determination that the case
was distinguishable from the student publications cases and cases in-
volving "other non-program related expressions of student expres-
sions.' 21° Since the court did not find applicable the balancing tests
provided by either line of cases, it was forced to rely on the judicial
deference rationale.231
authors of best-selling modern literature." Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 14 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
227. For example, it has been suggested that a child's natural curiosity about sexuality
"may best be met by frank discussion of some of the details of human sexual relations, even
though at the time the child has insufficient experience to make morally sound judgments
concerning the matters discussed. The advantage of earlier acquainting the child with the
facts is that it assists the development of judgment and provides for the immediate possibil-
ity of sound exercise of the faculty once acquired." Garvey, supra note 86, at 349.
228. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
229. See supra notes 44-56.
230. Apparently the Third Circuit was referring to Tinker and its progeny. 668 F.2d at
216. The Third Circuit did not expressly adopt the district court's view that "cases involving
the removal of books from the school library.. . address[ed] problems quite distinct from
that presented in this case." 512 F. Supp. at 238. However, the district court correctly dis-
tinguished Seyfried from the library censorship cases. Freedom of expression is the First
Amendment right at issue for the participating cast and crew members. The "right to
know"-an independent First Amendment consideration that should be recognized for stu-
dents who planned to attend the play-was not before the court in Seyfried.
231. 668 F.2d at 217.
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The Third Circuit should have characterized the play as an extra-
curricular activity serving as -a means of student expression. The play
was not part of a course, and participation was voluntary.2 32 It is well-
settled that "live drama" is a form of expression protected by the First
Amendment.233
By characterizing the play as student expression, the court would
have been required to balance the interests of the students and the
school using the Tinker test. In balancing the competing interests, the
Third Circuit could have taken judicial notice of the age and maturity
of the students involved. Regardless of the outcome, this approach
would have resulted in a more well-reasoned opinion.
The Court in Tinker, while mindful of the fact that students' First
Amendment rights must be "applied in light of the special characteris-
tics of the school environment, 234 held that students do not shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of expression "at the schoolhouse
gate."23 The Third Circuit reasonably could have characterized the
production of Pippin as a form of student expression that could not be
restricted absent a showing of "facts which might reasonably have led
school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material inter-
ference with school activities. '236 Although the Tinker test has been
used most often in student publications cases,237 the test should be
equally applicable to student expression by means of "acting out" writ-
ten words.
The school authorities in Seyfried did not present evidence that
might have allowed them to forecast substantial disruption or material
interference with the educational program. The play chosen for the
spring production admittedly was not obscene.238 Only those students
who volunteered were involved with the production and the activity
took place outside normal school hours. There was no allegation that
the participants either interrupted or interfered with other school func-
tions, or that casting and rehearsals intruded on classwork. In addition,
232. 512 F. Supp. at 238 n.5; 668 F.2d at 216. Students who were concurrently enrolled
in the theater arts course were required to participate in one of the two school plays pro-
duced each year in order to receive course credit. 512 F. Supp. at 238 n.5.
233. In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), the Supreme
Court noted: "By its nature, theater usually is the acting out-or singing out--of the written
word, and frequently mixes speech with live action or conduct. But that is no reason to hold
theater subject to a drastically different standard. . . . [T]he basic principles of freedom of
speech and the press. . . do not vary. Those principles. . . make freedom of expression the
rule. There is no justification in this case for making an exception to that rule." Id at 557-
58 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)).
234. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
235. Id
236. Id at 514.
237. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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there was no allegation that the play created disturbances or disorders
on the school premises.239
In balancing the interests of the administration against the stu-
dent's interest in freedom of expression, the Third Circuit could have
considered the age and maturity of the students involved24 and the
nature of the material the school administrators deemed inappropriate.
Pippin is the story of a young man who samples the experiences, includ-
ing sexuality, that life has to offer; the play concludes with Pippin's
discovery of genuine affection and other "things which he will ulti-
mately come to value."24 The Third Circuit could have taken judicial
notice 42 of the fact that adolescents are confronted daily with themes,
values, and lifestyles similar to those that were presented in the script.
The district court did note:
It is, of course, true that students have access to far more explicit
treatments of pre-marital and extra-marital sex than anything
contained in [the drama teacher's] modified version of Pippin
simply by turning on the television set. . . . It is also true that
there are other high schools which have successfully produced
Pippin in some form. Indeed, I am confident that there are many
school communities in which. . .[the] modified version would
239. The Third Circuit noted that schools exist for the specialized purpose of communi-
cating knowledge and social values, and that a school "has an important interest in avoiding
the impression that it has endorsed a viewpoint at variance with its educational program."
Seyfried, 668 F.2d at 216. These considerations may be valid. But see supra notes 218-28
and accompanying text. An administration might prefer not to permit production of a play
requiring students to enact two scenes in which premarital sex is simulated. See supra note
27. Yet the Supreme Court has stated that school officials "must be able to show that [their]
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and un-
pleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
Without a showing of interference with school activities or discipline, the school board in
Seyfried would have failed to prove more than a "mere desire to avoid discomfort" if the
Tinker test had been applied.
240. See supra notes 217-28 and accompanying text.
241. 512 F. Supp. at 237. In his concurrence to the Third Circuit opinion Judge Rosenn
suggested that the students did not contend that they subscribed to the weltanschauung em-
bodied in the play or that they wished to stage the play to voice their views. 668 F.2d at 217
(Rosern, J., concurring). It seems likely, however, that a story about a young person's at-
tempt to decide what he will do with his life, and the experiences that assist in making the
decision, would have a strong appeal for adolescents facing similar confrontations.
242. "Judicial notice" refers to a court's recognition of matters of common knowledge. A
fact is considered generally known when its existence or operation is accepted by the public
without qualification or contention. 29 AM. JUR. 2D, Evidence §§ 14, 22 (1967). The fact
that a belief is not universal is not controlling "since there is scarcely any belief that is
accepted by everyone." Id. at § 24. Arguably, a court can take judicial notice of the sophis-
tication and knowledge of high school students. See, e.g., Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359,
361 (Ist Cir. 1969) (in the context of discussing whether students have a right to receive
information, the court suggested that it "might well take judicial notice of [the use of the
word "mother-"] by young radicals and protesters from coast to coast").
be considered entirely appropriate .... 243
Had the Third Circuit considered the nature of the play in relation to
the age and maturity of the students involved, it could have found a
basis on which to rest a decision favorable to the students. Although
school administrators did not approve, the play presented values and
ideas with which students most likely were familiar. By cancelling the
play, the school board regarded its students, in the words of the Tinker
Court, as "closed-circuit recipients of only that which the state chooses
to communicate." 2 " The court also should have considered that the
role of education is more than indoctrinative. As Judge Rosenn stated
in his concurring opinion in Seyfred, one of the essential functions of
the educational process is "exposing young minds to the clash of ideol-
ogies in the free marketplace of ideas ..... 245
If the Third Circuit had used the Tinker test, the court would have
been unable to rely on the less used standard of "interference with the
rights of other students" to support a finding for the school board. The
school board in Seyfried could have argued that students who normally
would have participated in or attended the spring production might
have refrained from involvement because the play's sexual theme or
satire on religion might be offensive or cause "significant emotional
harm." 2' That argument, however, would likely fail. Even if a stu-
dent felt offended or threatened by material in Piopin, he would not
have been forced either to participate in or attend the production. In-
volvement in the extra-curricular drama was voluntary. Thus, students
who exercised their First Amendment right of expression by participat-
ing in the play would not have interfered with the rights of a student
who chose neither to participate nor attend. Further, even if the school
board had been able to forecast some harm to certain students, the
Third Circuit could have found that the board had available less dras-
tic means than cancelling the play.24 7 For example, prior to perform-
243. 512 F. Supp. at 240 n.8.
244. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
245. 668 F.2d at 219 (Rosenn, J., concurring). For a discussion of the merits of adopting
the marketplace of ideas concept in education, see supra notes 217-28 and accompanying
text.
246. See Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1977) (substantial basis for the
school administration's belief that the distribution of a student questionnaire polling high
school students' sexual beliefs and experience would result in significant emotional harm to
a number of students).
247. Even if the purpose for restricting expression is one of substantial governmental
interest, "that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of the legislative
abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
purpose." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (state has an interest in investigating
the background and fitness of its teachers, but a statute requiring teachers to file affidavits
listing all organizations to which they belonged went beyond its legitimate purpose and was
unconstitutional).
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ances, the school could post notices outlining the subject matter of the
play and mentioning that some of the scenes dealt with sexual material.
This simple procedure would protect the interests both of the students
who might have been offended by the play248 and those who chose to
participate in its production.
Conclusion
Given the current status of the law in the area of student freedom
of expression, the court in Seyfried could have rendered a better rea-
soned decision had it relied on the Tinker test instead of on the judicial
deference rationale. Yet, neither the Tinker nor the Pico standards are
adequate to insure that students are receiving full benefit of the First
Amendment. Secondary students enjoy a greater degree of sophistica-
tion than ever before. Furthermore, the media provides constant expo-
sure to conflicting values and controversial ideas. These factors
support an open classroom approach to education. Students should be
exposed to the widest possible range of ideas and provided with an
opportunity, under a teacher's guidance, to determine for themselves
the validity of various propositions. Currently, however, education
largely is expected to fulfill an indoctrinative role; the courts support
this philosophy by deferring to the judgment of educators even when
those judgments encroach upon First Amendment guarantees. The
best means of preparing individuals for citizenship and preserving the
values on which society rests is to provide a forum in which they are
exposed to ideas and are trained to analyze each facet of an abstraction.
Whether or not accepted by educators, the courts should embrace the
marketplace of ideas theory of education.
An approach like that employed in Tinker-but which also consid-
ers the age and maturity of student plaintiffs-will require a case by
case analysis that is more difficult to apply than the judicial deference
test. Nevertheless, as the Second Circuit noted in a student publica-
tions case, "[tlhe best one can hope for is to discern lines of analysis
and advance formulations sufficient to bridge past decisions with new
facts. . . . [I]t is a frustrating process which does not admit of safe
analytic harbors." 24 9 A modicum of judicial frustration is not too high
a price to pay for the careful consideration of students' rights as funda-
mental as those protected by the First Amendment.
248. The edited version of the play that would have been presented, see supra note 27,
probably involved less graphic sexual material than is depicted in motion pictures and on
television. It is therefore unlikely that many students would have been offended.
249. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 804-05 n.1 (2d Cir. 1971).
